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Abstract
This paper studies the cost effectiveness of climate policy if there are technology externalities.
For this purpose, we develop a forward-looking CGE model that captures empirical links
between CO2 emissions associated with energy use, directed technical change and the economy.
We find the cost-effective climate policy to include a combination of R&D subsidies and CO2
emission constraints, although R&D subsidies raise the shadow value of the CO2 constraint (i.e.
CO2 price) because of a strong rebound effect from stimulating innovation. Furthermore, we find
that CO2 constraints differentiated toward CO2-intensive sectors are more cost effective than
constraints that generate uniform CO2 prices among sectors. Differentiated CO2 prices, through
technical change and concomitant technology externalities, encourage growth in the non-CO2
intensive sectors and discourage growth in CO2-intensive sectors. Thus, it is cost effective to let
the latter bear relatively more of the abatement burden. This result is robust to whether emission
constraints, R&D subsidies or combinations of both are used to reduce CO2 emissions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing consensus that growing emissions of greenhouse gases pose a serious
threat to the world. One strategy for addressing this threat is to use environmental policy such as
a cap and trade system to constrain emissions; the approach envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol of
the Framework Convention on Climate Change that has entered into force and will be
implemented in most industrial nations beginning in 2008. The use of a cap and trade system in
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2this agreement was seen as a success of economic reasoning by many, because such systems are
widely heralded as generating a given level of abatement in the most “cost-effective” manner.
The Bush Administration has taken the United States out of the Kyoto Protocol and instead
adopted a technology policy that includes support for R&D as an alternative strategy, with the
idea that without technological options to reduce greenhouse gases an emission constraint will
mostly punish the economy by slowing economic growth. While such a punishment seems
mostly exaggerated for “small” reductions in emissions the ultimate goal of the Framework
Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations, requires that the world economy
reduces emissions by 90 to 95% from best projections of where it otherwise would be. This is
untested territory, and thus the need for new technology is real if these stabilization goals are to
be met. However, even recognizing that new technology is needed, one might believe that
appropriate environmental policy instruments—the right emissions constraint or tax—would
induce new technologies.
We study the cost effectiveness of these different strategies. If emissions are priced will that
induce technical change? Can R&D subsidies achieve emission reductions, and is this strategy
cheaper than using emission constraints? Are the two strategies complementary? Can one
improve on uniform emission-reduction policy by differentiating policy toward relatively dirty
technologies? Previous investigations of the two strategies include Jaffe et al. (2005) and the
general equilibrium analyses of Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Popp (2004), who show that
carbon taxes are cost effective when they are complemented by a R&D subsidy. In a cost-
minimization setting, Rosendahl (2004) and Bramoullé and Olson (2005) demonstrate
theoretically that technology externalities call for differentiation of pollution taxes. We proceed
by empirically studying these different strategies in which we pay specific attention to their
differentiation.
For this purpose, we develop a forward-looking computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
that captures empirical links between CO2 emissions associated with energy use, directed
technical change and the economy. We draw on endogenous growth models of Rivera-Batiz and
Romer (1991) and Acemoglu (2002) and specify technologies as stocks of knowledge capital
that are sector-specific investment goods, which have associated positive externalities. We
calibrate the model to the Dutch economy, where availability of investment data for knowledge
capital that is consistent with the national accounting framework allows us to pay special
attention to its representation in the benchmark data. Simulations are constructed to reveal cost
effective combinations of CO2 constraints and R&D subsidies, including the desirability of
differentiating these instruments among clean and dirty sectors.
2. BASIC FEATURES OF THE MODEL
This section describes the key specifications of our model. We offer a full description of the
model in Appendix A.
32.1 Model specifications
We specify a representative consumer and producers in the following sectors: agriculture
(AGR), CO2-intensive industry (IND), non-CO2 intensive industry and services (SER), trade and
transport (TT), energy (NRG), CO2-intensive electricity (CIE) and non-CO2 intensive electricity
(NCIE), where the energy sector comprises the oil- and gas industries. Agents behave rationally
and have perfect foresight. A representative consumer maximizes intertemporal utility subject to
the intertemporal budget constraint. Intertemporal utility is a function of the discounted sum of
consumption over the time horizon. Environmental quality does not enter the utility function,
implying independence of the demand functions for goods with respect to environmental quality.
Producers maximize profits over time subject to their production-possibility frontier, which
are determined by nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions of knowledge
capital, physical capital, labor, and intermediate inputs. In addition, imported coal is used in the
production of CO2-intensive goods and electricity. Intermediate usage of oil, gas, and coal entail
CO2 emissions, which might be subject to quantity constraints, i.e. cap and trade systems.
Technical change is characterized by innovation possibility frontiers, which describe
investment in knowledge capital in the sectors. Knowledge capital is sector specific (c.f. Basu
and Weil, 1998). Further, technical change is a deterministic process and aggregate innovation
possibility frontiers are continuous, which allows us to avoid problems due to uncertainty or
integer variables.
1
 Investments in knowledge capital merely involve final goods as input. In
addition, there is positive delayed feedback in technical change in that previous investments in
knowledge capital have a positive external effect on the efficiency of current investments, i.e.
learning-by-researching (henceforth referred to as positive feedback).
2
 We specify this positive
feedback operating within each sector only but relax this assumption in the sensitivity analysis.
Finally, knowledge-capital investments accumulate into stocks, which gives rise to an additional
technology externality on sector production. The rationale for this externality is that, while
producers can prevent others from using their knowledge capital by means of patent protection,
they cannot completely prevent knowledge embodied in patents from spilling over to other
producers in their sector. These two types of technology externalities lead to the result that profit
maximizing firms underinvest in R&D and thus there exists a rationale to subsidize investments
in knowledge capital (henceforth referred to as R&D subsidies).
Regarding international trade, domestically produced goods and physical capital are allocated
between domestic and export markets. Goods traded on domestic markets are combined with
imported goods into an Armington (1969) aggregate, which satisfies demand for intermediate-
and final goods. An exception is coal imports, which are directly used in certain CO2-intensive
industries and the CO2-intensive electricity sector. Domestic investment in physical capital is
combined with foreign investment into an Armington aggregate as well, satisfying investment
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 Even though indivisibility of knowledge capital and uncertainty related to R&D processes are facts of life,
averaging out makes these facts matter less at aggregate levels (Romer, 1990).
2
 Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) dub this specification ‘knowledge-based’ in contrast to the former specification,
which they dub ‘lab-equipment’ for its emphasis on physical inputs.
4demand for physical capital. We do not model international trade in knowledge capital. As a
small open economy, it is potentially easy for the Netherlands to meet CO2-emission constraints
by specializing in non-CO2 intensive sectors so that the implied emissions occur outside the
economy. While that might be a realistic response for a small economy independently pursuing a
CO2 reduction policy, if it succeeds only by increasing emissions elsewhere there is little or no
real climate benefit. The Armington specification, as opposed to a Heckscher-Ohlin formulation,
closes international trade in a way that limits this leakage effect.
2.2 Equilibrium and growth
Each agent solves its optimization problem. When markets clear at all points in time, the
output, price and income paths constitute an equilibrium. Markets for production factors and
final goods are perfectly competitive but there initially is no market for CO2 emissions associated
with energy use. The technology externalities support nonconvexities in the possibility frontiers
and cause private and social returns to knowledge capital to diverge.
Economic growth reflects the growth rates of the labor supply and stocks of physical and
knowledge capital. Growth of the labor supply is exogenous and constant over time. Growth
rates of both capital stocks stem from endogenous saving and investment behavior. The economy
achieves balanced growth over time with the stocks of physical and knowledge capital growing
at the same rate as the labor supply.
3. CALIBRATION
In this section, we describe the calibration of our model in which we pay special attention to
the accounting of knowledge capital. Accounting for knowledge capital in CGE models is
relatively new and, when undertaken, is typically done in a rudimentary fashion because of
absence of detailed information. Because of the availability of investment data for knowledge
capital in The Netherlands that is consistent with the national accounting framework, we
calibrate our model to the Dutch economy. We choose 1999 as the benchmark year.
3.1 Accounting for knowledge capital
To account for knowledge capital, we identify and capitalize flows associated with knowledge
and subsequently incorporate these in the national accounting matrix (Statistics Netherlands,
2000). We follow De Haan and Rooijen-Horsten (2004) and identify expenditures on R&D,
expenditures on education (EDU) and investments in information- and communication
infrastructure (ICT) as knowledge flows.
3
 ICT is included because of its role in disseminating
and storing knowledge and is therefore an important part of the infrastructure required for
knowledge capital to be productive.
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 We are aware that this identification entails to a certain degree unavoidable randomness. There are many types of
knowledge and knowledge may be embedded not only in software and books but also in e.g., people and
traditions. It therefore is difficult to comprehensively measure and aggregate knowledge. Yet, it is not altogether
different from aggregating physical capital goods. The main difference is, of course, that it is difficult to attach a
value to knowledge capital (Griliches, 1979).
5To capitalize these knowledge flows, we take the following two steps. First, we create an
additional (column) account registering investments in the stock of knowledge capital and an
additional (row) account registering services derived from the stock. Investment in ICT is reported
as investment and expenditures on R&D and education are reported as derived services. We
assume the Dutch economy to be on a balanced growth path in 1999, which implies a fixed
relation between investments in and services derived from the sector-specific stocks of knowledge
capital. This relation gives us the total column and row accounts for knowledge capital as a result
of the three knowledge flows. Second, we debit the national accounting matrix to avoid double
counting. Given that investments in ICT are originally reported as investments in physical capital,
we debit the investment (column) account with the amounts of investment in ICT. Expenditures on
R&D and education are originally reported as intermediate consumption requiring us to debit the
intermediate goods matrix. We follow Terleckyj (1974) and assume that knowledge is embodied
in tangible goods and services, which allows us to debit each sector’s expenditures on education
and R&D from the sector’s consumption of intermediate goods proportionally to its sector of
origin. We balance the national accounting matrix by adjusting the (row) account for labor.
3.2 Data and parameter values
Besides accounting for knowledge capital, we make further data adjustments to account for
CO2 emissions associated with energy use. We divide the electricity sector into CO2-intensive
and non-CO2-intensive electricity generation using techno-economic data for the key
technologies that are sufficient to give an appropriate representation for both types of electricity
generation (Böhringer, 2003). Table B.1 (see Appendix B) presents cost structures and market
shares of the electricity generation technologies in The Netherlands. Further, we obtain data on
fossil-fuel inputs in The Netherlands from the GTAP-EG database (Palstev and Rutherford,
2000) and match this data with CO2 emission data for The Netherlands (Koch et al., 2002). We
classify CO2-intensive industry, trade and transport, energy and CO2-intensive electricity as CO2-
intensive sectors and agriculture, non-CO2 intensive industry and services and non-CO2 intensive
electricity as non-CO2 intensive sectors. Table B.2 presents the national accounting matrix and
Table B.3 reports factor- and CO2 intensities.
Turning to model parameters, we use general parameter values that are standard in the
literature (see Tables A.5-6 in Appendix A). Regarding international trade, however, we assume
unitary substitution elasticity between domestic and foreign commodities, which is lower than is
often used. This limits the leakage effect discussed above. Many of the largest trading partners of
The Netherlands are implementing similar environmental policies, such as the EU emissions
trading scheme, which limits effects of international trade on relative factor shares. Regarding
technology-related parameters, we use a 25% depreciation rate for knowledge capital.
4
 Pakes and
Schankerman (1979) study patent renewals in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, The
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Alternatively, one can take the view that knowledge doesn’t depreciate at all. This assumption is likely to be valid
if the sector or industry under study is narrowly defined and its stock of knowledge capital changes only slowly
(Griliches, 1988). This assumption is less likely to be valid, however, if one defines sectors more broadly or for
periods where one might suspect more rapid obsolescence of knowledge capital such as the decades following
the ICT boom.
6Netherlands and Switzerland and find a point estimate for the depreciation rate of 25% with a
confidence interval between 18 and 35%. This estimate is consistent with data on lifespans of
applied R&D expenditures, which suggests an average service life of four to five years. More
recently, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) have estimated a geometric depreciation rate for computer
equipment and software of 31.5%. Further, we assume a positive feedback effect in technical
change of 20% being the difference between the private- and social returns to knowledge capital.
The former is at least equal to the 25% depreciation rate whereas estimates of the latter lie in the
range of 30-60% (see e.g. Baumol, 2002, or Otto et al., 2006), who find a positive feedback
effect of 45% with delays up to eight years). We base the coefficient value for the knowledge
spillovers on Coe and Helpman (1995) who estimate the elasticity of R&D stocks on total factor
productivity at 9% for non-G7 OECD countries.
Finally, we consider a 27-year time horizon, defined over the years 1999 through 2025, and
calibrate the model to a balanced growth path of two percent, which serves as reference case in
the simulations below.
4. SIMULATIONS
We analyze cost-effectiveness of both environmental- and technology policy to reduce
cumulative CO2 emissions in production over the time horizon of the model by 10% relative to
the reference case, where we differentiate both policies between CO2-intensive and non-CO2-
intensive sectors. Environmental policy takes the form of quantity constraints for CO2 emissions
(i.e. cap and trade systems) and technology policy takes the form of R&D subsidies. To avoid
leakage of CO2 emissions to consumption in all simulations, we also reduce these emissions by
10% relative to the reference case using a separate quantity constraint.
4.1 Simulation 1: Differentiated CO2-emission constraints
Figure 1 shows effects of the various possibilities to differentiate the CO2 emission constraint
between CO2-intensive and non-CO2-intensive sectors on shadow prices of CO2 emissions in the
sectors (lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph). We explain this figure in several
steps, starting with the horizontal axes that list percentage changes in CO2 emissions of the non-
CO2-intensive sectors. As a first step, we set these percentage changes exogenously and calculate
the CO2-emission constraint for the CO2-intensive sectors necessary for total emissions in
production to be reduced by 10%. Second, we use the model to calculate the general equilibrium
result associated with each differentiation of both CO2 emission constraints. The lower graph
maps the corresponding sets of shadow prices for CO2 emissions required to meet the sectoral
emission constraints. In general, technology externalities positively affect the shadow prices. In
this simulation, however, we find the shadow prices with technology externalities to exhibit
negligible differences from those without technology externalities.
5
 For this reason, we present
only one curve for each sector in this graph. Yet, the technology externalities have a noticeable
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 The difference between shadow prices with and without technology externalities is difficult to graphically detect in
this simulation. Technology externalities have a positive effect on the shadow price of CO2 emissions because of
their positive effect on welfare and hence overall demand for energy and concomitant CO2 emissions. Yet, this
effect is limited in this simulation because of the deadweight losses associated to the CO2 emission constraints.
7Figure 1. Effects of differentiated CO2-emission constraints on discounted utility. Notes: CO2 emissions
in the CO2-intensive sectors change to the extent that overall CO2 emissions in production are reduced by 10%.
effect on welfare. As a last step, therefore, we map the changes to discounted utility that
correspond with each differentiation of the CO2 emission constraints in the upper graph. Utility
indices smaller than one imply welfare losses relative to the reference case. The upper curve
shows the welfare loss if there are technology externalities whereas the lower curve shows the
welfare loss if there are none. The left dashed vertical line represents the set of uniform shadow
prices, which is the cost-effective (highest welfare) set if there are no technology externalities.
The right dashed vertical line represents the set of differentiated shadow prices, which is the
cost-effective set if there are technology externalities.
We find that the conventional result of uniform shadow prices across sectors being cost
effective holds if there are no technology externalities. The 10% emission reduction in
production entails a welfare loss of 0.36% over the time period and results in a shadow price of
?2.25 per ton CO2 in all sectors. When there are technology externalities, however, we find that
welfare is higher for all differentiations of the CO2 emission constraints. If the constraints can be
set at different levels, we find it cost effective to differentiate the constraints toward the CO2-
intensive sectors. The 10% emission reduction in production now entails a welfare loss of 0.34%
over the time period and results in shadow prices of ?2.30 per ton CO2 in the CO2-intensive
sectors and ?1.60 per ton CO2 in the non-CO2-intensive sectors. CO2 emission constraints direct
technical change toward non-CO2 intensive sectors yielding relatively more technology
8externalities in these sectors and therefore raising their opportunity cost of abatement. The
electricity sector, for example, redirects its R&D toward biomass and wind technologies
resulting in relatively more knowledge spilling over from the development of these technologies
than fossil-fuel electricity technologies. Thus, it is cheaper to shift some abatement toward CO2-
intensive technologies and sectors.
The bias in technical change can be best understood with help of the general framework
presented by Acemoglu (2002) or the framework applied to energy biased technical change of
Otto et al. (2005). On the supply side of the economy, CO2-emission constraints give rise to a
substitution effect in production in that knowledge capital substitutes for fossil fuels raising the
profitability of investing in knowledge capital in the CO2-intensive sectors. On the demand side,
however, CO2-emission constraints give rise to a substitution effect in consumption as
consumers shift toward non-CO2-intensive goods raising the profitability of investing in
knowledge capital in the non-CO2-intensive sectors. When introducing CO2 emission constraints,
we find the demand side to be relatively important as substitution in consumption is necessary
for cost-effective emission reduction. Technology externalities reinforce the bias.
4.2 Simulation 2: Differentiated R&D subsidies
We now study R&D subsidies as our instrument to reduce overall CO2 emissions in
production by 10% relative to the reference case. Figure 2 shows effects of the various
possibilities to differentiate the CO2 emission reduction between CO2-intensive and non-CO2-
intensive sectors on required R&D subsidies (lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph).
We obtain Figure 2 in a similar fashion as Figure 1 except that we now compute R&D subsidy
rates instead of shadow prices of CO2 emissions in general equilibrium. Finally, the left dashed
vertical line represents the set of uniform R&D subsidies and the right dashed vertical line
represents the set of differentiated R&D subsidies.
We find that R&D subsidies can also achieve the 10% emission reduction in production. In
fact, differentiating R&D subsidies toward non-CO2 intensive sectors not only can reduce
emissions but also increases welfare compared to the reference case. Table 1 shows that
compared to the hypothetical reference case, however, using R&D subsidies to achieve the
emission reduction always entails a welfare loss as R&D subsidies are a first-best instrument to
internalize technology externalities but a second-best instrument to reduce emissions.
The cost-effective set of R&D subsidies yields a welfare gain of 11.6% over the time period
and comprises an R&D subsidy of 48% in the non-CO2-intensive sectors and an R&D tax of
36% in the CO2-intensive sectors. Although the introduction of an R&D subsidy in the non-CO2-
intensive sectors has a negative effect on CO2 emissions because of substitution effects in
production and consumption, the R&D subsidy also gives rise to a strong rebound effect that
offsets the substitution effects. As the R&D subsidy lowers the marginal costs of non-CO2-
intensive goods, it indirectly increases demand for these goods and the concomitant demand for
energy and CO2 emissions. More importantly, by internalizing some of the technology
externalities as well, the R&D subsidy increases welfare leading to an overall higher demand for
9energy and CO2 emissions that strengthens the rebound effect. If R&D subsidies are the sole
instruments of choice, an R&D tax in CO2-intensive sectors is thus preferred in the cost-effective
solution to keep overall emissions within bounds.
6
 Essentially, the policy is one of supporting
growth of non-CO2 intensive sectors while slowing it in CO2-intensive sectors. Introducing R&D
subsidies in all sectors is feasible albeit cost ineffective in achieving the emission reduction.
Figure 2. Effects of differentiated R&D subsidies on discounted utility. Notes: CO2 emissions in the CO2-
intensive sectors change to the extent that overall CO2 emissions in production are reduced by 10%.
Table 1. Effects of policies on discounted utility (percent change from reference).
% change from: original reference hypothetical reference
reference cases
original 0.00 –28.20
hypothetical with correction for technology externalities 28.20 0.00
simulations
differentiated CO2-emission constraints –0.34 –28.54
differentiated R&D subsidies to reduce CO2 emissions 11.60 –16.60
combinations of differentiated CO2-emission constraints
and differentiated R&D subsidies
27.08 –1.12
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 This finding is in line with other studies. Popp (2004), for example, finds that subsidizing energy R&D yields
significant increases in energy technology but nevertheless has little effect on CO2 emissions.
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4.3 Simulation 3: Combinations of differentiated CO2-emission constraints and
differentiated R&D subsidies
We next study combinations of CO2 emission constraints and R&D subsidies as our
instruments to abate CO2 emissions in production by 10% relative to the reference case. For this
purpose, we augment the first simulation by introducing combinations of differentiated R&D
subsidies before computing the general equilibrium associated with each differentiation of the
CO2 emission constraints. This way we can identify both the cost-effective set of differentiated
CO2 emission constraints and the efficient set of differentiated R&D subsidies. Figure 3 shows
effects of the various possibilities to differentiate the CO2 emission constraint between CO2-
intensive- and non-CO2-intensive sectors on shadow prices of CO2 emissions in the sectors
(lower graph) and discounted utility (upper graph) when the efficient set of R&D subsidies is
introduced next to the CO2-emission constraints.
Figure 3. Effects of cost-effective set of differentiated CO2 emission constraints and differentiated
R&D subsidies on discounted utility. Notes: CO2 emissions in the CO2-intensive sectors change to the extent
that  overall CO2 emissions in production are reduced by 10 percent.
11
Emission reduction is cost effective if R&D subsidies complement rather than substitute for
CO2 emission constraints. The cost-effective set of instruments yields a welfare gain of 27.1%
over the time period and comprises R&D subsidies of 62% and 52% in the CO2-intensive and
non-CO2-intensive sectors as well as shadow prices of ?15.40 and ?4.20 per ton CO2 in the
respective sectors. Of course, the emission reduction still comes at a cost when compared to the
hypothetical reference case in which we would already correct for the technology externalities
(see Table 1). Compared with this hypothetical case, welfare falls by 1.12% over the time period,
which is significantly more than the 0.34% welfare loss in the case where we do not yet make
such a correction (see the first simulation). The CO2 emission constraints are more binding when
the technology externalities are already corrected and hence they entail a bigger deadweight loss.
Regarding differentiation of the policy instruments, we find that continued differentiation
remains a feature of the cost-effective policy in this simulation because of interacting policy
effects. The CO2 emission constraints are principally introduced to reduce emissions but also
induce technical change and concomitant technology externalities. Similarly, R&D subsidies
correct for the technology externalities but at the same time affect CO2 emissions. The R&D
subsidies are now differentiated toward CO2-intensive sectors, as they are in the hypothetical
reference case in which we just correct technology externalities without regard for emission
reduction, and subsequently direct technical change toward these sectors. CO2 shadow prices
remain differentiated in this simulation as technology externalities, and hence the opportunity
costs of abatement, remain higher in non-CO2 intensive sectors because of their initial size and
knowledge intensity. Compared to the first simulation though, the difference in shadow prices
narrows while shadow prices increase in magnitude because of the CO2-emission constraints
being more binding.
4.4 Macro-economic effects
Table 2 shows that the three simulations have different macro-economic effects besides
having different welfare implications. Contracted growth characterizes the first simulation with
CO2 emission constraints. Except for non-CO2-intensive industry and services, all sectors lower
their production relative to the reference case, where CO2-intensive sectors decrease their
production relatively more as they are subject to the more stringent CO2 emission constraints.
With respect to inputs to production, the factor substitution effect in production increases
marginal returns to factors other than energy, where the marginal return to physical capital
increases to the extent that investments in physical capital actually increase slightly relative to
the reference case. Foreign investment changes accordingly. International trade in goods falls
proportionally to domestic trade as we assume trading partners of The Netherlands to introduce
similar CO2 emissions abatement policies. Biased growth characterizes the second simulation
with R&D subsidies. By using R&D subsidies in non-CO2 intensive sectors and R&D taxes in
CO2-intensive sectors, one speeds up growth in the former while slowing it in the latter. The
production structure, for example, shifts markedly from CO2-intensive to non-CO2-intensive
goods. Although increased welfare and limited substitution possibilities in the economy lessen
12
Table 2. Effects of CO2-reduction policies on the Dutch economy (percentage changes).
Simulation: 1 2 3
2005 2015 2025 2005 2015 2025 2005 2015 2025
Production Total –0.4 –0.6 –0.9 30.9 44.8 45.2 47.6 77.3 96.0
   CO2 intensive IND –0.7 –1.3 –2.0 –7.7 –7.4 –26.5 88.6 137.0 167.5
TT –0.7 –1.3 –2.0 –9.0 –12.7 –37.1 36.4 61.1 75.0
NRG –4.6 –7.2 –10.9 –10.6 –7.0 –27.5 12.7 25.8 21.1
CIE –1.1 –1.8 –2.8 –6.5 –1.0 –9.4 46.2 73.9 81.3
   Non-CO2 intensive AGR –0.6 –1.2 –1.8 16.2 21.4 –8.6 20.1 58.9 83.3
SER 0.1 0.2 0.3 48.3 73.8 89.0 50.7 78.6 97.6
NCIE –0.3 –0.6 –0.8 22.6 30.8 16.4 31.9 70.9 95.9
Investments in knowledge capital Total –0.2 –0.3 –0.5 243.6 279.1 310.1 337.0 491.8 600.8
   CO2 intensive IND –0.9 –1.6 –2.2 –36.7 –41.6 –52.6 650.6 959.4 1191.7
TT –1.0 –1.7 –2.4 –36.4 –46.6 –61.1 365.0 541.5 633.6
NRG –5.2 –8.1 –11.5 –41.4 –41.3 –53.8 235.2 370.5 363.5
CIE –1.2 –1.9 –2.7 –39.0 –34.6 –38.7 403.6 616.3 696.0
   Non-CO2 intensive AGR –0.9 –1.4 –2.1 169.2 177.1 77.6 167.0 362.4 472.2
SER 0.0 0.2 0.2 320.3 367.9 415.5 303.3 435.1 533.2
NCIE –0.4 –0.6 –0.8 180.2 222.4 159.4 193.6 412.7 535.2
Investments in physical capital 1.0 1.6 2.0 37.9 86.0 122.5 37.3 40.9 49.3
Exports of goods –0.9 –1.7 –2.6 0.8 –3.0 –38.2 30.2 57.3 73.6
Imports of goods –0.6 –1.0 –1.5 3.8 11.1 3.9 31.4 56.1 69.7
Foreign investment 0.8 1.3 1.5 12.8 51.3 77.7 38.0 42.8 50.8
Shadow price of CO2 emissions CI 2.3 2.3 2.3 15.4 15.4 15.4
NCI 1.6 1.6 1.6 4.2 4.2 4.2
Subsidy on investments in CI –0.36 –0.36 –0.36 0.62 0.62 0.62
knowledge capital NCI 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.52
Notes: Shadow prices of CO2 emissions are in €/t CO2. AGR is agriculture, IND is CO2-intensive industry, TT is the trade and
transport sector, SER is non-CO2 intensive industry and services, NRG is the energy sector, CIE is CO2-intensive electricity
and NCIE is non-CO2 intensive electricity. CI refers to CO2-intensive sectors and NCI to non-CO2 intensive sectors.
the negative impact for the CO2-intensive sectors for the first half of the model horizon, these
sectors are hit hard afterwards when more substitution has been taking place and path
dependency in technical change is strong. Further, more physical capital is required to expand
the non-CO2-intensive sectors and as a result investments in physical capital increase. Foreign
investments change accordingly. Finally, more goods are now imported and fewer goods
exported. Enhanced growth characterizes the third simulation with both CO2 emission constraints
and R&D subsidies. Because of the introduction of R&D subsidies in all sectors, total factor
productivity and hence production levels increase throughout the economy relative to the
reference case. As a result, demand for production factors increases as is reflected in, among
others, increased investment in physical capital. Foreign investments and international trade in
goods change accordingly.
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
Table 3 reports the sensitivity of our results to key parameter values. We use central
parameter values in all sensitivity simulations (see Tables A.5-6 in Appendix A) except for the
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parameter subject to analysis. Given the importance of technical change for our findings, we
focus on technology parameters, which simultaneously are a good proxy for the knowledge-
capital accounting. Effects are reported as index values compared to the regular simulations.
The general result from Table 3 is that our findings are robust to the range of parameter values
considered. The cost-effective set of instruments still includes R&D subsidies as complements
to, rather than substitutes for, CO2 emission constraints while the cost-effective differentiation
remains unchanged (no index value changes sign).
Turning to the specific parameters subject to analysis, lowering the depreciation rate of
knowledge capital ( H? ) by 25% has a negative effect on discounted utility in all simulations as
fewer investments in knowledge capital are required yielding less positive feedback in technical
change.
7
 The overall decrease of technology externalities reduces the relative opportunity cost of
CO2 abatement in the non-CO2-intensive sectors and hence the cost-effective differentiation of
the CO2 emission constraints in the third simulation. As R&D subsidies fall relatively more in
non-CO2-intensive sectors in the third simulation, the gap between R&D subsidies widens. In the
second simulation, this gap widens as well albeit for a different reason. Bigger stocks of
knowledge capital enhance total factor productivity and the rebound effect, ceteris paribus. It
therefore is cost effective to further differentiate R&D subsidies to keep emissions within
bounds. The opposite holds if we increase the depreciation rate of knowledge capital by 25%.
Table 3. Piecemeal sensitivity analysis.
Discounted utility Cost-effective differentiation of instruments
Simulation: 1 2 3 1 2 3
 U  U  U  
p
CI
EM - p
NCI
EM
 
s
CI
- s
NCI  
p
CI
EM - p
NCI
EM
 
s
CI
- s
NCI
Regular simulation 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
H? low 1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.09 0.93 1.10
H? high 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.00 0.92 1.04 0.90
? low 1.00 0.95 0.93 1.00 0.93 0.99 1.10
? high 1.00 1.09 1.13 1.00 1.05 1.01 0.80
? uniform 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.59 0.86 0.90
H? low 1.00 0.96 0.94 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.20
H? high 1.00 1.05 1.07 1.00 1.27 1.01 0.70
Notes: All numbers are indexed to the regular simulation. Results in Simulation 1 are robust at the 1% precision level.
Simulation 1 refers to differentiated CO2-emission constraints; Simulation 2 to differentiated R&D subsidies; Simulation 3
to combinations of differentiated CO2-emission constraints and differentiated R&D subsidies. Low and high refer to 25%
lower and higher parameter values than in the regular simulation and uniform refers to positive feedback in technical
change being specified to operate across sectors. U denotes discounted utility, pEM denotes the shadow price of CO2
emissions and s denotes the R&D subsidies.
Lowering the positive-feedback effect in technical change (? ) by 25% has a negative effect
on discounted utility in all simulations as fewer technology externalities are enjoyed. The
                                                 
7
 At the same time, lower depreciation rates lead to bigger stocks of knowledge capital yielding more knowledge
spillovers. This positive welfare effect, however, is outweighed by the negative welfare effect of less positive
feedback in technical change.
14
decrease of technology externalities reduces the relative opportunity cost of CO2 abatement in
non-CO2-intensive sectors and hence the cost-effective differentiation of R&D subsidies in the
second simulation and of CO2 emission constraints in the third simulation. As R&D subsidies
fall relatively more in non-CO2 intensive sectors in the third simulation, the gap between R&D
subsidies widens. The opposite holds if we increase the positive-feedback effect by 25%.
Specifying a positive feedback in technical change to operate across rather than within sectors
has a small negative effect on discounted utility, especially in the second simulation, as
technology externalities in the non-CO2-intensive sectors now also benefit CO2-intensive sectors
requiring a higher R&D tax in the latter to keep emissions within bounds. Consequently, the
cost-effective differentiation of R&D subsidies widens in the second simulation. In the third
simulation, however, the cost-effective differentiation of both policy instruments narrows as
positive feedback benefits all sectors while the policy instruments are used for their first-best
purpose.
Finally, lowering the substitution elasticity between knowledge capital and other factors in
production ( H? ) by 25% has a negative effect on discounted utility in especially the second- and
third simulations as substitution possibilities to adjust to the CO2 abatement are limited.
Moreover, the limited substitution possibilities translate into lower demands for knowledge
capital and therefore fewer technology externalities. Consequently, changes in model results are
similar to the analysis in which we changed the height of the positive-feedback effect.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Recent interest has arisen with respect to the role of induced innovation in environmental
policy, particularly regarding climate change. The Kyoto Protocol that many industrial countries
are pursuing relies on a conventional cap and trade system to constrain emissions. The US has
withdrawn and has instead adopted technology policy as an alternative strategy with the intent of
directing R&D to reduce CO2 emissions. The questions we addressed in this paper are: Which
strategy is preferred from a welfare perspective or does a combination of both strategies work
better? Can one improve on uniform emission-reduction policy by differentiating policy toward
CO2-intensive sectors?
To answer these questions, we developed a forward-looking computable general equilibrium
model that captures empirical links between CO2 emissions associated with energy use, directed
technical change and the economy. We specified technologies as knowledge capital, which are
sector-specific investment goods and which empirical research has long found to cause positive
technology externalities leading to underinvestment relative to what is socially optimal.
At this point, it is necessary to add some policy reality to the discussion. If policies can be
designed to correct for technology externalities the economy can gain substantially. We show
this to be the case, such that welfare in the Dutch economy under study can be improved by
nearly 30% over our 27-year time span. We find that R&D subsidies that are optimally
differentiated to achieve a 10% reduction in CO2 emissions improve the economy by about 12%
relative to the reference case where technology externalities are not yet internalized. This appears
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to be a double-dividend world where CO2 emissions are reduced while leaving the economy
better off. The difficulty, however, is how to design such technology policy in reality. The
unrealized 30% welfare gain from the technology externalities is evidence of the difficulty of
correcting for them. Our best past efforts, patent protection and government funded R&D, leave
us with significant underinvestment. To realize the emission reduction requires that we overcome
the known limits of government funding and intellectual property rights protection and then
direct technology policy toward non-CO2-intensive sectors. Our results suggest that the
differential policy to achieve the emission reduction needs to be very strong. Essentially, it
means creating disincentives for R&D in CO2-intensive sectors causing them to wither away, and
creating large subsidies for non-CO2-intensive sectors, accelerating their growth. If it is possible
to ideally correct for the technology externalities, we find that the preferred policy is to do so in
combination with CO2 emission constraints, i.e. cap and trade systems. These constraints are
costly to the economy relative to the case where technology externalities are corrected for
without reducing emissions, but a combination is much preferred to R&D subsidies alone or
emission constraints alone.
Regardless of the particular instruments chosen, we find that technology externalities call for
differentiation of instruments between non-CO2-intensive and CO2-intensive sectors, such that
the latter bear relatively more of the abatement burden. Essentially such differentiation partly
corrects for the CO2 implications of the technology externalities. The welfare gain for
differentiated emission constraints is relatively small compared with uniform constraints. The
gain is large for the differentiation of R&D subsidies; in fact, uniform R&D subsidies are
negative in all sectors, essentially slowing economic growth to achieve the emission reduction
with highly negative welfare effects relative to the reference case or the cases involving emission
constraints.
Thus, is a true double dividend possible? In principle differentiated R&D subsidies with or
without CO2 emission constraints lead to that result, relative to the reference case. However, if
we can design such precise incentives for R&D we might as well compare our situation to a
reference case where technology externalities are already corrected without regard to emission
reduction. Compared to the “R&D corrected” reference case, emission constraints entail a larger
welfare loss than does the “emission constraints only case” relative to the reference case where
technology externalities are not yet corrected. So, the answer depends in part on perspective and
in large part on the confidence one has that public policy can effectively direct R&D.
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APPENDIX A. STRUCTURE AND PARAMETER VALUES OF THE MODEL
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the model. We formulate the model as a
mixed-complementarity problem using the Mathematical Programming System for General
Equilibrium Analysis (Rutherford, 1999), which is a subsystem of the General Algebraic
Modeling System (Ferris and Munson, 2000). In this approach, three classes of equilibrium
conditions characterize an economic equilibrium: zero-profit conditions for production activities,
market clearance conditions for each primary factor and good, and an income definition for the
representative consumer. The fundamental unknowns of the system are activity levels, market
prices, and the income level. The zero profit conditions exhibit complementary slackness with
respect to associated activity levels, the market clearance conditions with respect to market
prices, and the income definition equation with respect to the income of the representative
consumer. The notation 
z?  denotes the zero profit condition for activity z and the orthogonality
symbol ?  associates variables with complementary slackness conditions. For the sake of
transparency, we use the acronyms CES (constant elasticity of substitution), CD (Cobb Douglas),
and LT (Leontief) to indicate functional form. Differentiating profit and expenditure functions
with respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand and supply coefficients
(Hotelling’s lemma), which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions. An
equilibrium allocation determines production levels, relative prices, and incomes. We choose the
price of intertemporal utility as numeraire and report all prices in present values. Tables A.1
through A.6 list the nomenclature.
A.1  Zero profit conditions
Production of goods:
 
?
i,t
Y ? H i,t??  CES r
i,t
H , p
i,t
KLEM ;? H( ) ? pi,t ? 0  ? Yi,t  i = 1,.., I ;  t = 1,..,T (A.1)
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Aggregate production of electricity:
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Investments in knowledge capital:
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Stock of knowledge capital:
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Investments in physical capital:
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Armington aggregate:
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Imports of goods:
 
?
i,t
IM Y ? p
t
FX ? p
t
IM ? 0
 
? IM
i,t
Y
 i = 1,.., I ;  t = 1,..,T (A.8)
Imports of coal:
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Foreign direct investment:
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Exports of goods:
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Exports of physical capital:
 
?
t
EX K ? r
t
K ? p
t
FX ? 0
 
? EX
t
K
 t = 1,..,T (A.12)
Intratemporal utility:
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Intertemporal utility:
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A.2  Market clearing conditions
Goods:
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Electricity:
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Knowledge capital (in market):
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Knowledge capital (in stock):
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Physical capital (in market):
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Physical capital (in stock):
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Coal (imports):
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Import aggregate:
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Armington aggregate:
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Foreign investments:
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Foreign exchange:
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CO2 emissions in consumption:
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CO2 emissions in production:
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Intratemporal utility:
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Intertemporal utility:
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A.3  Income balance
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A.4  Endowments
Supply of labor:
 
L
t
= 1+ g( )
t?1
L
0  t = 1,..,T (A.32)
Balance of Payments:
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A.5  Constraints
CO2 emission constraint of environmental policy in consumption:
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CO2 emission constraint of environmental policy in production in Simulations 1 and 3:
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CO2-emission constraint of technology policy in simulation 2:
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Terminal condition for physical capital:
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Terminal condition for physical capital:
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A.6  Nomenclature
Table A.1 Sets and indices.
i  AGR, IND,TT ,SER, NRG,CIE, NCIE Sectors and goods (aliased with j)
E  NRG,CIE, NCIE Energy (sectors)
EL  CIE, NCIE Electricity (sectors)
FF  COAL, NRG Fossil fuel (sectors)
c
 
CI : IND,TT , NRG,CIE
NCI : AGR,SER, NCIE
Sectors according to CO2 intensity
t  1,..,T Time periods
Table A.2 Activity variables.
,itY Production of goods in sector i at time t
tEL Aggregate production of electricity at time t
,itH Stock of knowledge capital in sector i at time t
 H i,t
Knowledge spillover applied to sector i at time t
 
TH
i
Terminal stock of knowledge capital in sector i
 
R
i,t Investments in knowledge capital in sector i at time t
 Ri,t
Feedback in technical change applied to sector i at time t
 
K
t
Stock of physical capital at time t
 TK Terminal stock of physical capital
 
I
t
Investments in physical capital at time t
 
A
i,t
Armington aggregate of domestic- and foreign intermediate
goods in sector i at time t
 
IM
i,t
Y
Aggregate imports of goods in sector i at time t
 
IM
t
COAL Aggregate imports of coal at time t
 
FDI
t
Foreign direct investment at time t
 
EX
t
Y Aggregate exports of goods at time t
 
EX
t
K Aggregate exports of physical capital at time t
 
W
t
Intratemporal utility at time t
 U Intertemporal utility
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Table A.3 Income and endowment variables.
 B Budget of the representative agent
 
BOP
0
Initial Balance of Payments of the domestic representative agent
 
BOP
t
Balance of Payments of the domestic representative agent at time t
 
H
0i
Initial stock of knowledge capital in sector i
 
K
0
Initial stock of physical capital
 
L
0
Initial endowment of labor
 
L
t
Endowment of labor at time t
 
EM
0
Initial allowances of CO2 emissions
 EM Overall allowances of CO2 emissions
Table A.4 Price variables (in present values).
p Prices
FX
tp Price of foreign exchange at time t
EMp Shadow prices of CO2 emissions
cs Subsidy on investments in knowledge capital in sectors c
tr Rental rate of capital at time t
tw Wage rate at time t
Table A.5 Parameters.
Description Value
a Abatement of CO2 emissions 0.10
? Knowledge spillover coefficient 0.09
? Coefficient of positive feedback in technical change 0.20
g Growth rate 0.02
r Interest rate 0.05
K? Depreciation rate of physical capital 0.05
H? Depreciation rate of knowledge capital 0.25
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Table A.6. Elasticities
Description Value
Elasticity of substitution in intertemporal utility
? Between time periods 0.5
Elasticities of substitution in intratemporal utility
YE
W? Between energy and other goods 0.5
E
W? Between electricity and fossil fuels 0.7
Elasticities of substitution in international trade
A? Between domestic and foreign commodities 1.0
Elasticities of substitution in aggregate electricity production
EL? Between CO2-intensive and non-CO2 intensive electricity 1.0
Elasticities of substitution in production sector AGR IND TT SER NRG CIE NCIE
H? Between knowledge capital andremaining inputs 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
 
?
i
KLEM
Between intermediate inputs and
remaining inputs 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.1
 
?
i
M Between intermediate inputs 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.1
 
?
i
KLE Between labor and remaining inputs 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1
 
?
i
KE Between physical capital and energy 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
 
?
i
E Between electricity and fossil fuels 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
FF
i? Between fossil fuels 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5
Notes: The substitution elasticities in utility are assumed. The substitution elasticity in intertemporal utility lies between
smaller values typically found in time-series studies (e.g., Hall, 1998) and larger values typically found in studies that also
exploit cross-sectional data (e.g., BwUDRY AND WINCOOP, 1996). The substitution elasticity in international trade is lower
than usual to reflect introduction of similar CO2 emission reduction policies by most of the trading partners of The
Netherlands. We obtain the substitution elasticities in production from the TaxInc model (STATISTICS NETHERLANDS,
1990), except for the substitution elasticity between knowledge capital and remaining inputs, which we obtain from
Goulder and Schneider (1999), and except the substitution elasticity in aggregate electricity production, which is
assumed.
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APPENDIX B. DATA
Table B.1  Cost and market shares of electricity technologies (%).
Cost shares Market share
Physical
Capital Labor Energy
Intermediate
inputs Total
CO2 intensive
Natural-gas fired 24.9   5.6 62.2   7.3 100.0 56.9
Hard-coal fired 38.6   5.6 23.7   9.0   76.9 25.5
Oil-fired 46.9   2.2 40.3 10.6 100.0  7.6
Non-CO2 intensive
Biomass 18.8   6.6 58.5   83.9  4.6
Nuclear 59.0   5.1 17.4   81.5  4.4
Wind 86.4 19.8 106.2  1.0
Source: Böhringer et al. (2003)
Table B.2  National accounting matrix for The Netherlands in 1999 (million euro).
A
g
ri
cu
lt
ur
e
C
O
2-
in
te
n
si
ve
 in
d
us
tr
y
Tr
ad
e 
an
d
 tr
an
sp
or
t
N
on
-C
O
2 i
n
te
n
si
ve
 in
d
us
tr
y 
&
 s
er
vi
ce
s
En
er
g
y
C
O
2-
in
te
n
si
ve
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
N
on
-C
O
2 i
n
te
n
si
ve
 e
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
Ex
p
or
ts
C
on
su
m
p
ti
on
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 p
h
ys
ic
al
 c
ap
it
al
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 k
n
ow
le
d
g
e 
ca
p
it
al
Su
p
p
ly
 c
h
an
g
es
To
ta
l
Agriculture 16.69 0.10 0.13 2.66 0.02 0.02 32.73 10.52 0.76 2.28 0.07 65.96
CO2-intensive
industry 1.22 4.92 1.43 8.29 0.13 0.05 0.07 34.66 3.96 0.28 7.31 0.01 62.31
Trade and
transport 0.62 0.65 3.14 4.03 0.23 0.01 0.02 77.38 7.06 0.51 6.87 –0.01 100.50
Non-CO2 intensive industry
& services 4.94 4.84 14.60 65.57 1.03 0.64 0.08 30.78 157.80 89.33 59.92 0.15 429.67
Energy 1.01 0.94 1.49 1.08 4.17 0.83 10.85 5.37 0.07 1.05 0.08 26.93
Electricity 0.55 0.63 0.57 0.73 0.05 3.32 0.39 2.07 2.20 0.01 0.60 0.00 11.13
Imports 16.58 21.01 13.75 58.18 6.06 1.26 62.90 23.59 0.25 203.56
Taxes minus
subsidies 1.08 0.12 –0.98 2.40 4.60 0.38 0.06 7.66
Labor 6.91 10.90 33.23 132.72 1.23 0.76 0.09 185.84
Physical
capital 13.84 10.09 25.52 87.43 8.26 2.16 0.31 0.56 16.96 3.50 168.63
Knowledge
capital 2.53 8.12 7.63 66.58 1.17 0.60 0.07 86.71
Total 65.96 62.31 100.50 429.67 26.93 10.01 1.12 189.02 266.76 118.04 78.03 0.54 1348.90
Sources: Statistics Netherlands (2002), Böhringer et al. (2003), De Haan and Rooijen-Horsten (2004) and own calculations.
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Table B.3 Selected factor-intensities of the Dutch economy in 1999 (% of gross sectoral product)
Knowledge capital
Physical
capital
Labor CO2
Sector R&D EDU ICT Total
Production
CO2 intensive 3.2 4.8 0.7  8.7 23.0 23.1   0.08
CO2-intensive industry 8.3 4.4 0.4 13.1 16.2 17.5   0.03
Trade and transport 0.8 6.3 0.6  7.7 25.4  33.0   0.03
Energy 1.8 1.3 1.3  4.4 30.7   4.6   0.33
CO2-intensive electricity 1.3 2.4 2.3  6.0 21.6   7.6   0.19
Non-CO2 intensive 3.7 8.7 1.5 13.9 20.5 28.1 <0.01
Agriculture 1.8 1.6 0.4  3.8 21.0 10.5   0.01
Non-CO2 intensive industry & services 4.0 9.8 1.7 15.5 20.4 30.9 <0.01
Non-CO2 intensive electricity 1.3 2.4 2.3  6.0 28.3  7.8   0.00
Consumption   0.01
Note: Capital intensities are respectively services derived from knowledge- and physical capital expressed as percentages of
gross sectoral product. CO2 intensities are CO2 emissions in Mt. expressed as percentage of gross sectoral product in million
euros. We obtain data on knowledge capital from De Haan and Rooijen-Horsten (2004) and data on CO2 emissions from
the GTAP-EG database (Paltsev and Rutherford, 2000) and the Emission Monitor for The Netherlands (Koch et al., 2002).
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge.
1. Uncertainty in Climate Change Policy Analysis
Jacoby & Prinn December 1994
2. Description and Validation of the MIT Version of the
GISS 2D Model Sokolov & Stone June 1995
3. Responses of Primary Production and Carbon Storage
to Changes in Climate and Atmospheric CO2
Concentration Xiao et al. October 1995
4. Application of the Probabilistic Collocation Method
for an Uncertainty Analysis Webster et al. January 1996
5. World Energy Consumption and CO2 Emissions:
1950-2050 Schmalensee et al. April 1996
6. The MIT Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis
(EPPA) Model Yang et al. May 1996 (superseded by No. 125)
7. Integrated Global System Model for Climate Policy
Analysis Prinn et al. June 1996 (superseded by No. 124)
8. Relative Roles of Changes in CO2 and Climate to
Equilibrium Responses of Net Primary Production
and Carbon Storage Xiao et al. June 1996
9. CO2 Emissions Limits: Economic Adjustments and the
Distribution of Burdens Jacoby et al. July 1997
10. Modeling the Emissions of N2O and CH4 from the
Terrestrial Biosphere to the Atmosphere
Liu  August 1996
11. Global Warming Projections: Sensitivity to Deep Ocean
Mixing Sokolov & Stone September 1996
12. Net Primary Production of Ecosystems in China and
its Equilibrium Responses to Climate Changes
Xiao et al. November 1996
13. Greenhouse Policy Architectures and Institutions
Schmalensee November 1996
14. What Does Stabilizing Greenhouse Gas
Concentrations Mean? Jacoby et al. November 1996
15. Economic Assessment of CO2 Capture and Disposal
Eckaus et al. December 1996
16. What Drives Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon?
Pfaff December 1996
17. A Flexible Climate Model For Use In Integrated
Assessments Sokolov & Stone March 1997
18. Transient Climate Change and Potential Croplands of
the World in the 21st Century Xiao et al. May 1997
19. Joint Implementation: Lessons from Title IV’s Voluntary
Compliance Programs Atkeson June 1997
20. Parameterization of Urban Sub-grid Scale Processes
in Global Atmospheric Chemistry Models
Calbo et al. July 1997
21. Needed: A Realistic Strategy for Global Warming
Jacoby, Prinn & Schmalensee August 1997
22. Same Science, Differing Policies; The Saga of Global
Climate Change Skolnikoff August 1997
23. Uncertainty in the Oceanic Heat and Carbon Uptake
and their Impact on Climate Projections
Sokolov et al. September 1997
24. A Global Interactive Chemistry and Climate Model
Wang, Prinn & Sokolov September 1997
25. Interactions Among Emissions, Atmospheric
Chemistry and Climate Change  Wang & Prinn
September 1997
26. Necessary Conditions for Stabilization Agreements
Yang & Jacoby October 1997
27. Annex I Differentiation Proposals: Implications for
Welfare, Equity and Policy Reiner & Jacoby Oct. 1997
28. Transient Climate Change and Net Ecosystem
Production of the Terrestrial Biosphere
Xiao et al. November 1997
29. Analysis of CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel in Korea:
1961–1994 Choi November 1997
30. Uncertainty in Future Carbon Emissions: A Preliminary
Exploration Webster November 1997
31. Beyond Emissions Paths: Rethinking the Climate Impacts
of Emissions Protocols Webster & Reiner November 1997
32. Kyoto’s Unfinished Business Jacoby et al. June 1998
33. Economic Development and the Structure of the
Demand for Commercial Energy Judson et al. April 1998
34. Combined Effects of Anthropogenic Emissions and
Resultant Climatic Changes on Atmospheric OH
Wang & Prinn April 1998
35. Impact of Emissions, Chemistry, and Climate on
Atmospheric Carbon Monoxide Wang & Prinn April 1998
36. Integrated Global System Model for Climate Policy
Assessment: Feedbacks and Sensitivity Studies
Prinn et al. June 1998
37. Quantifying the Uncertainty in Climate Predictions
Webster & Sokolov July 1998
38. Sequential Climate Decisions Under Uncertainty: An
Integrated Framework Valverde et al. September 1998
39. Uncertainty in Atmospheric CO2 (Ocean Carbon Cycle
Model Analysis) Holian Oct. 1998 (superseded by No. 80)
40. Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using
Marginal Abatement Curves Ellerman & Decaux Oct. 1998
41. The Effects on Developing Countries of the Kyoto
Protocol and CO2 Emissions Trading
Ellerman et al. November 1998
42. Obstacles to Global CO2 Trading: A Familiar Problem
Ellerman November 1998
43. The Uses and Misuses of Technology Development as
a Component of Climate Policy Jacoby November 1998
44. Primary Aluminum Production: Climate Policy,
Emissions and Costs Harnisch et al. December 1998
45. Multi-Gas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol
Reilly et al. January 1999
46. From Science to Policy: The Science-Related Politics of
Climate Change Policy in the U.S. Skolnikoff January 1999
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge.
47. Constraining Uncertainties in Climate Models Using
Climate Change Detection Techniques
Forest et al. April 1999
48. Adjusting to Policy Expectations in Climate Change
Modeling Shackley et al. May 1999
49. Toward a Useful Architecture for Climate Change
Negotiations Jacoby et al. May 1999
50. A Study of the Effects of Natural Fertility, Weather
and Productive Inputs in Chinese Agriculture
Eckaus & Tso July 1999
51. Japanese Nuclear Power and the Kyoto Agreement
Babiker, Reilly & Ellerman August 1999
52. Interactive Chemistry and Climate Models in Global
Change Studies Wang & Prinn September 1999
53. Developing Country Effects of Kyoto-Type Emissions
Restrictions Babiker & Jacoby October 1999
54. Model Estimates of the Mass Balance of the
Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets Bugnion Oct 1999
55. Changes in Sea-Level Associated with Modifications
of Ice Sheets over 21st Century Bugnion October 1999
56. The Kyoto Protocol and Developing Countries
Babiker et al. October 1999
57. Can EPA Regulate Greenhouse Gases Before the
Senate Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol?
Bugnion & Reiner November 1999
58. Multiple Gas Control Under the Kyoto Agreement
Reilly, Mayer & Harnisch March 2000
59. Supplementarity: An Invitation for Monopsony?
Ellerman & Sue Wing April 2000
60. A Coupled Atmosphere-Ocean Model of Intermediate
Complexity Kamenkovich et al. May 2000
61. Effects of Differentiating Climate Policy by Sector:
A U.S. Example Babiker et al. May 2000
62. Constraining Climate Model Properties Using
Optimal Fingerprint Detection Methods  Forest et al.
May 2000
63. Linking Local Air Pollution to Global Chemistry and
Climate Mayer et al. June 2000
64. The Effects of Changing Consumption Patterns on the
Costs of Emission Restrictions Lahiri et al. Aug 2000
65. Rethinking the Kyoto Emissions Targets
Babiker & Eckaus August 2000
66. Fair Trade and Harmonization of Climate Change
Policies in Europe Viguier September 2000
67. The Curious Role of “Learning” in Climate Policy:
Should We Wait for More Data? Webster October 2000
68. How to Think About Human Influence on Climate
Forest, Stone & Jacoby October 2000
69. Tradable Permits for Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
A primer with reference to Europe Ellerman Nov 2000
70. Carbon Emissions and The Kyoto Commitment in the
European Union Viguier et al. February 2001
71. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis
Model: Revisions, Sensitivities and Results
Babiker et al. February 2001 (superseded by No. 125)
72. Cap and Trade Policies in the Presence of Monopoly
and Distortionary Taxation Fullerton & Metcalf Mar 2001
73. Uncertainty Analysis of Global Climate Change
Projections Webster et al. March 2001
(superseded by No. 95)
74. The Welfare Costs of Hybrid Carbon Policies in the
European Union Babiker et al. June 2001
75. Feedbacks Affecting the Response of the
Thermohaline Circulation to Increasing CO2
Kamenkovich et al. July 2001
76. CO2 Abatement by Multi-fueled Electric Utilities:
An Analysis Based on Japanese Data
Ellerman & Tsukada July 2001
77. Comparing Greenhouse Gases Reilly et al. July 2001
78. Quantifying Uncertainties in Climate System
Properties using Recent Climate Observations
Forest et al. July 2001
79. Uncertainty in Emissions Projections for Climate
Models Webster et al. August 2001
80. Uncertainty in Atmospheric CO2 Predictions from a
Global Ocean Carbon Cycle Model
Holian et al. September 2001
81. A Comparison of the Behavior of AO GCMs in
Transient Climate Change Experiments
Sokolov et al. December 2001
82. The Evolution of a Climate Regime: Kyoto to
Marrakech Babiker, Jacoby & Reiner February 2002
83. The “Safety Valve” and Climate Policy
Jacoby & Ellerman February 2002
84. A Modeling Study on the Climate Impacts of Black
Carbon Aerosols Wang March 2002
85. Tax Distortions and Global Climate Policy
Babiker et al. May 2002
86. Incentive-based Approaches for Mitigating
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Issues and Prospects for
India Gupta June 2002
87. Deep-Ocean Heat Uptake in an Ocean GCM with
Idealized Geometry Huang, Stone & Hill
September 2002
88. The Deep-Ocean Heat Uptake in Transient Climate
Change Huang et al. September 2002
89. Representing Energy Technologies in Top-down
Economic Models using Bottom-up Information
McFarland et al. October 2002
90. Ozone Effects on Net Primary Production and Carbon
Sequestration in the U.S. Using a Biogeochemistry
Model Felzer et al. November 2002
91. Exclusionary Manipulation of Carbon Permit
Markets: A Laboratory Test Carlén November 2002
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge.
92. An Issue of Permanence: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Temporary Carbon Storage Herzog et al. December 2002
93. Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial?
Babiker et al. December 2002
94. Modeling Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Abatement
Hyman et al. December 2002
95. Uncertainty Analysis of Climate Change and Policy
Response Webster et al. December 2002
96. Market Power in International Carbon Emissions
Trading: A Laboratory Test  Carlén January 2003
97. Emissions Trading to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions in the United States: The McCain-Lieberman
Proposal  Paltsev et al. June 2003
98. Russia’s Role in the Kyoto Protocol Bernard et al.
June 2003
99. Thermohaline Circulation Stability: A Box Model Study
Lucarini & Stone June 2003
100. Absolute vs. Intensity-Based Emissions Caps
Ellerman & Sue Wing July 2003
101. Technology Detail in a Multi-Sector CGE Model:
Transport Under Climate Policy Schafer & Jacoby July 2003
102. Induced Technical Change and the Cost of Climate
Policy Sue Wing September 2003
103. Past and Future Effects of Ozone on Net Primary
Production and Carbon Sequestration Using a Global
Biogeochemical Model Felzer et al.  (revised) January 2004
104. A Modeling Analysis of Methane Exchanges
Between Alaskan Ecosystems and the Atmosphere
Zhuang et al. November 2003
105. Analysis of Strategies of Companies under Carbon
Constraint Hashimoto January 2004
106. Climate Prediction: The Limits of Ocean Models
Stone February 2004
107. Informing Climate Policy Given Incommensurable
Benefits Estimates Jacoby February 2004
108. Methane Fluxes Between Terrestrial Ecosystems
and the Atmosphere at High Latitudes During the
Past Century Zhuang et al. March 2004
109. Sensitivity of Climate to Diapycnal Diffusivity in the
Ocean Dalan et al. May 2004
110. Stabilization and Global Climate Policy
Sarofim et al. July 2004
111. Technology and Technical Change in the MIT EPPA
Model Jacoby et al. July 2004
112. The Cost of Kyoto Protocol Targets: The Case of
Japan Paltsev et al. July 2004
113. Economic Benefits of Air Pollution Regulation in the
USA: An Integrated Approach Yang et al.
(revised) January 2005
114. The Role of Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases in Climate
Policy: Analysis Using the MIT IGSM   Reilly et al.
August 2004
115. Future United States Energy Security Concerns
Deutch  September 2004
116. Explaining Long-Run Changes in the Energy
Intensity of the U.S. Economy Sue Wing Sept. 2004
117. Modeling the Transport Sector: The Role of Existing
Fuel Taxes in Climate Policy Paltsev et al. November 2004
118. Effects of Air Pollution Control on Climate
Prinn et al. January 2005
119. Does Model Sensitivity to Changes in CO2 Provide a
Measure of Sensitivity to the Forcing of Different
Nature? Sokolov March 2005
120. What Should the Government Do To Encourage
Technical Change in the Energy Sector?
Deutch May 2005
121. Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in
Japan Kasahara et al. May 2005
122. A 3D Ocean-Seaice-Carbon Cycle Model and its
Coupling to a 2D Atmospheric Model: Uses in Climate
Change Studies Dutkiewicz et al.  (revised) November 2005
123. Simulating the Spatial Distribution of Population
and Emissions to 2100 Asadoorian May 2005
124. MIT Integrated Global System Model (IGSM)
Version 2: Model Description and Baseline Evaluation
Sokolov et al. July 2005
125. The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis
(EPPA) Model: Version 4  Paltsev et al. August 2005
126. Estimated PDFs of Climate System Properties
Including Natural and Anthropogenic Forcings
Forest et al. September 2005
127. An Analysis of the European Emission Trading
Scheme Reilly & Paltsev October 2005
128. Evaluating the Use of Ocean Models of Different
Complexity in Climate Change Studies
Sokolov et al. November 2005
129. Future Carbon Regulations and Current
Investments in Alternative Coal-Fired Power Plant
Designs  Sekar et al. December 2005
130. Absolute vs. Intensity Limits for CO2 Emission
Control: Performance Under Uncertainty
Sue Wing et al. January 2006
131. The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence
from Agricultural Profits and Random Fluctuations in
Weather   Deschenes & Greenstone January 2006
132. The Value of Emissions Trading Webster et al.
February 2006
133. Estimating Probability Distributions from Complex
Models with Bifurcations: The Case of Ocean
Circulation Collapse Webster et al. March 2006
134. Directed Technical Change and Climate Policy
Otto et al.  April 2006
